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Institutional Controls for Contaminated Sites:
Help or Hazard?*
Mary R. English & Robert B. Inerfeld**
Introduction
Federal Superfund law was built on the failure of institutional
controls. The inability of zoning regulations and private land use
restrictions to control development at Love Canal near Niagara Falls,
N.Y., led to construction of a school on an abandoned industrial dump
containing 21,000 tons of highly toxic chemical wastes and to the
construction of adjacent houses. By 1978, more than 25 years after
industrial activities had stopped, contamination had migrated into the
basements of local homes and had been carried by a rising water table
to the surface of the school yard. A public emergency was declared, and
the site was soon in the spotlight of national attention.
1
Over past decades, many activities have contaminated sites, as has
defense-related activities of the U.S. Departments of Defense and
Energy. Some complied with applicable regulations; others were outside
the law. All sites can pose problems for not only those responsible for
their cleanup, but also for communities and local governments
responsible for wise land use. Handled well, such sites can be
reintegrated into the community; handled poorly, they remain blighted
and unproductive "brownfields".
* This article is based on a 1997 study under Cooperative Agreement CR822-614-
01 between the Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and the University of Tennessee. Its authors, assume responsibility
for its findings and opinions as well as any errors of fact or interpretation.
** Dr. English is a Research Leader of the Energy, Environment, and Resources
Center at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. She holds a Ph.D., (Sociology) from
that university, a M.S. (Regional Planning) from the University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, and a B.A. (American Literature) from Brown University). E-mail:
menglish@utk.edu
Mr Inerfeld is employed by the Neighborhood Design Center in Baltimore, MD.
he holds a M.S., (City and Regional Planning) from the University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, as well as a B.S.E. and B.A.S. from the University of Pennsylvania)
1 Robert Hersh et al., Linking Land Use and Superfund Cleanups: Uncharted
Territory, 65-6 (June 1997).
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In the wake of Love Canal, the 1980 federal Superfund law2
addressed our most seriously contaminated sites. According to the
National Priorities List (NPL), approximately 1,200 sites are being
cleaned up under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
guidance. In addition, thousands of other sites have known or suspected
contamination, many being handled under similar state programs.
Initially, the Superfund program was authorized for five years with
a $1.6 billion revolving fund; by the late 1980s, there was a growing
realization that it could take decades and a trillion dollars to clean up
NPL and other contaminated sites.3 Some technical difficulties have
also become apparent, especially if deep soils or groundwater are
contaminated. Remediating sites to background or non-detect levels is
increasingly recognized as often infeasible or impractical. Goals are
more likely to be risk-based, i.e. with the primary aim is to minimize
health and environment risks rather than eliminate contaminants. With
increased emphasis on risk-based standards, and growing recognition
that some sites simply cannot be fully cleaned up, institutional controls
have become important.
This discussion primarily reviews recent articles on the efficacy of
institutional controls. Although interest in such controls has grown
rapidly during the 1990s, few empirical studies address their efficacy.
Two exceptions are surveys conducted by the Association of State and
Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials and the International
City/County Management Association. 4 Both surveys of state or
local officials point to important problems, such as inexperience with
institutional controls, confusion about allocation of responsibility,
programmatic deficiencies and insufficient funding.
These studies are a start, but because both had limited sets of
respondents, further systematic investigation is needed. Nevertheless,
society may not be able to wait. Much can be learned now by reflecting
on what is already known. In parallel, much more needs to be
understood about the institutions that do or might be responsible for
2 More formally, the Comprehensive Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA).
3 E. William Colglazier et al., Hazardous Waste Remediation: The Task Ahead
(U.Tennessee 1991).
4 Christine Gaspar & Denise Van Burik, Local Government Use of Institutional
Controls at Contaminated Site (Int'l. City/County Mgmt. Ass'n 1998).
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institutional controls. How durable are they? What is their track record
of fulfilling obligations such as oversight and enforcement? How
effective are their information storage and retrieval systems? Such
questions are considered only in passing but must also be addressed if
we are to better assess the strengths and limitations of our safeguards.
What Are "Institutional Controls"?
At the core, institutional controls prevent exposure to contaminants.
Even if hazardous substances remain in the environment, risks will be
minimized if the chain from hazard to health effect is broken by
severing exposure pathways (ingestion, aspiration and dermal contact).
One or more controls may be adopted to serve related but different
purposes. In many instances, the main goal is to prevent exposure to
contaminants by placing constraints on the use of sites through deed
restrictions and zoning changes. For example, if a residually
contaminated site is used for industrial rather than residential purposes,
people (especially vulnerable people such as children and the elderly)
will, in many cases, be at lower risk of exposure. Restrictions might also
be placed on new building construction to prevent disturbing soils and
spreading contaminants. In other instances, exposure through drinking
water may be the primary concern, in which case institutional controls
might include, for example, testing well water, restricting new well
digging, and providing alternative water supplies. In addition, off-site
migration of contaminants may necessitate ongoing monitoring as part
of the remedial measures. While monitoring is often treated as distinct
from institutional controls, we include it here because it does not
reduce contamination; instead, it is intended to prevent exposure.
Institutional controls must be implemented to prevent exposure to
residual contaminants. Such institutional controls are heavily relied
upon by the actions of an organization or individual. In most cases,
these actions must be maintained not only in the short-term but for as
long as hazards remain on the residually contaminated site. Unlike
elimination of contaminants, institutional controls leave a legacy of
responsibility that can extend far into the future.
Often, this legacy falls to the states rather than to EPA. Under
CERCLA and its implementing regulations, EPA may acquire a
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property interest in order to conduct a remedial action only if the state
will accept transfer of the interest upon completion of the
remediation. 5 Furthermore, the regulations require that if a
remediation is financed by the revolving fund rather than by a
potentially responsible party, the state must assume responsibility for
maintaining any institutional controls included as part of the
remedy. 6
Requisite Characteristics oflnstitutional Controls
When accompanied by appropriate treatment, cleanup, and
containment measures, institutional controls can serve as ongoing
safeguards to human health and the environment. They must, however,
meet high standards if they are to succeed in preventing exposure to
residual contaminants.
First, an institutional control must be effective. It must accomplish
its intended purpose, such as limiting future site uses or monitoring for
migration of contaminants. Second, it must be appropriate. An
institutional control may operate precisely as intended but still not
protect human and environmental health. For example, if the
institutional control successfully restricts site access but contamination
migrates beyond the site. Third, it must be verifiable. For example, if a
monitoring system is put in place to determine whether groundwater
contamination is spreading, that monitoring system will itself require
monitoring to verify that the agreed-upon sampling, testing, and
reporting protocol is being followed. Fourth, it must be enforceable. If
an institutional control is not being carried out as intended, corrective
measures must be available. For example, if a site restricted to industrial
use is to be sold and converted to mixed commercial/residential use,
public agencies or private citizens must have the legal means to prevent
that conversion or require further cleanup.
Institutional controls should be durable. The total package of
institutional controls at a site must prevent exposure to residual
contaminants for as long as exposure poses a risk, or until the residual
contaminants are remediated. Lastly, institutional controls should be
flexible; in other words, they should be adaptable to a variety of sites
5 See 40 C.F.R. 300.510(f).
6 See 40 C.F.R. 300.510(c)(1).
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and surroundings. While an institutional control often will require some
site-specific tailoring, it should be cut from a common cloth if it is to
be readily put into place, monitored, and enforced.
Scope of the Following Analysis
The following provides a critical review of four principal types of
institutional controls: 1) deed restrictions based on common law; 2)
deed restrictions based on relatively new state statutes; 3) local land use
controls such as zoning; and 4) other controls such as fencing,
notification systems, and monitoring.
Not discussed here in depth, but important for federal or state
Superfund sites, are consent decrees and administrative orders. Consent
decrees are negotiated with the potentially responsible party(ies); in
contrast, administrative orders are unilateral expressions of the
regulatory agency's authority. In both cases, restrictions can be placed
on the use of the residually contaminated property with relative ease
and can carry the threat of penalties if violations occur. However, both
consent decrees and administrative orders have the distinct
disadvantage of limited applicability. Typically, they do not bind
subsequent land owners or users not named as a party in the order or
decree. 7 Thus, while these enforcement documents can be used for
restricting uses (as well as for other purposes), it has been recommended
that they be supplemented with other instruments such as those
discussed below.8
As will become evident, however, there are many holes in the armor
of most institutional controls. The task we all face is to search for ways
to mend these holes and use only institutional controls that have a good
chance of preventing exposure to contaminants, now and in the future.
Deed Restrictions Based on Common Law
The body of common law that applies to restrictions on property
use is that of servitudes, "the most complex and archaic body of
American property law remaining in the twentieth century."9 A
7 U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Workgroup on Institutional Controls,
Institutional Controls: A Reference Manual, (draft March 1998).
8 Id.
9 Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient
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servitude is a burden resting upon one estate for the benefit of another
estate or person.10 Within the context of institutional controls,
servitudes are provisions attached to deeds which restrict property use
by forbidding such activities as soil disturbance, well drilling, or
residential development; they may also enable access to property for the
purpose of monitoring, testing, and remediating if necessary. 11
There are several different servitude devices, a few of which can be
used as institutional controls: restrictive covenants, equitable servitudes,
and easements. Sometimes referred to collectively as "deed
restrictions," they all serve the same basic purpose - they create rights,
responsibilities, and restrictions affecting ownership and use of land. In
addition, they all have the ability to be permanent: If certain conditions
are met, their burdens and benefits may "run with the land" to
successive owners. However, each has somewhat different rules
regarding how they can be created, interpreted, and terminated.
Restrictive Covenants
Restrictive covenants impose restrictions on the owner or user of a
property. To be enforceable, they must comply with a complicated set
of legal rules which have evolved over centuries.
Courts have established four technical prerequisites that must be
met for a covenant to be a real covenant, or a "running covenant at law"
(i.e., running with the land and enforceable against successors): (1) the
covenant must be in writing and enforceable between the covenanting
parties; (2) the covenanting parties must intend to bind successors; (3)
the original and successor parties must stand in "privity of estate" with
each other (i.e., there must be a relationship between these parties); and
(4) the benefit and the burden of the covenant must "touch and
concern" the land. 12
Most restrictive covenants, if properly established, will satisfy the
first three requirements. The final requirement, however - the
requirement that the covenant "touch and concern" the land - can
pose difficulties for covenants intended as ongoing institutional
Strands, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261-1319 (1982).
10 Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).
11 Susan C. Borinsky, The Use of Institutional Controls in Superfund and Similar
State Laws, 7 Fordham Envtl L. J. 1 (1995).
12 Id.
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controls. Clearly, a restrictive covenant "touches and concerns" the
burdened party's land. If it does not touch and concern the land of the
covenant holder - as would usually be the case with a restrictive
covenant for a contaminated site - the covenant still may be
enforceable over time. 13 This area of law remains murky, however,
creating uncertainty about whether restrictive covenants will be durable
institutional controls. 14
Moreover, restrictive covenants can be extinguished if they are
successfully argued in court - for example, by arguing the doctrine of
changed conditions or to various defenses such as laches (waiting
unreasonably long to sue for enforcement), acquiescence (failing to
enforce similar restrictions against other violators), or relative hardship
(the harm to the defendant outweighs the benefit to the plaintiff).15
And, even if the covenant is upheld, restrictions on property use have
tended to be strictly constructed in favor of the property owner. 16
If a restrictive covenant fails because it does not meet the four
requirements mentioned above, it still may be enforceable as an
equitable servitude. First, however, the court must find that an
equitable servitude exists. 17 In addition, equitable servitudes share
many of the limitations of restrictive covenants.
Equitable servitudes
Equitable servitudes were developed in England in the mid-1800s.
Historically, they restricted the use of land and were enforced in courts
of equity, normally by issuance of an injunction. To determine whether
equitable servitudes are enforceable, courts have adopted prerequisites
from the law of easements and the law of covenants. 18 Like easements,
equitable servitudes have somewhat more relaxed requirements than
restrictive covenants. Like restrictive covenants, however, restrictions on
land uses through equitable servitudes are not liberally interpreted in
court and may not be enforceable if a successful case is brought based
13 Edward E. Chase, In American Law of Real Property (Arthur R. Gaudio ed.
1991).
14 French, supra note 9.
15 Chase, supra note 13.
16 Id.
17 Krista J. Ayers, The Potential for Future Use Analysis in Superfiind Remediation
Programs, 44 EmoryL. J. 1503-39 (1995).
18 French, supra note 9.
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on arguments such as changed conditions, laches, acquiescence, or
relative hardship. 19
Easements
An easement is an interest in another's land entitling the easement
holder to either use or control the land in a specified way. In easement
terminology, the burden rests on the servient estate for the benefit of
another estate or person. Easements can be freely granted, or some
form of payment can be required. At contaminated sites, the easement
typically would be freely granted as part of an agreed approach to
remediation and would be held by EPA or the state government.
Two kinds of common law easements can be used as institutional
controls: negative easements and affirmative easements. Negative
easements impose a duty on the owner or occupier of the servient tract
to refrain from certain uses of the property. Affirmative easements give
the holder of the dominant tenement the right to use or go on the land
of another for a particular purpose - for example, allowing
government officials to monitor and test for contamination. 20
With contaminated sites, easements are usually in gross. An
easement in gross is created without regard to any land owned by the
holder of the easement; it does not need to "touch and concern" that
particular land. In contrast, if land owned by the easement holder will
benefit by the specified conditions, the easement is called appurtenant.
While English common law traditionally has prohibited easements in
gross, American law has allowed them for certain purposes.
Nevertheless, problems can be encountered over time with easements in
gross, especially if they are transferred.
Despite the fact that easement burdens generally "run with the
land," in some states an easement in gross might be considered as
personal to the holder of the easement and might be canceled upon
transfer of title. 2 1 It is clear that, to be transferred from one holder to
19 Chase, supra note 13.
20 French, supra note 9. CERCLA specifies that when contaminated federal
property is sold or transferred, the deed must contain an environmental access
easement assuring that the government can conduct future remediation if necessary;
40 U.S.C. §. 9620(h)(3).
21 Robert Hersh et al., Linking Land Use and Superfuind Cleanups: Uncharted
Territory (June 1997).
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another, easements in gross must be explicitly assigned; however, courts
have taken several positions on the questions of assignability.2 2 In
addition, if the holder of an easement fails to take timely legal action
against a violation of the easement, a court may terminate the easement
on a finding of abandonment or misuse.23
Easements under common law appear to be more capable than real
covenants or equitable servitudes of withstanding court challenges and
remaining durable. It is important, however, that they be clearly written
with explicit provisions concerning intent, notice, and assignment. And
even then enforceability, especially of use restrictions embodied in
negative easements, is not absolutely assured.
Deed Restrictions Based on Statutory Law
To make deed restrictions more secure, they can be backed by
legislation rather than relying on common law. Conservation easements
provide a possible model for statutory easements concerning residually
contaminated property. In addition, a few states have enacted statutes
specifically enabling use restrictions for contaminated property.
Conservation easements
Statutes authorizing conservation easements and establishing the
rules for their use have been enacted in every state except Alabama,
Oklahoma, and Wyoming.24 These easements traditionally have been
used to protect areas with historic, environmental, recreational, scenic,
or agricultural value. Typically, the easement is held by a non-profit or
governmental entity that has an interest in restricting development on
the property.
In general, a conservation easement prohibits the landowner from
significantly altering the existing natural, open, scenic, or ecological
condition of the land. Each conservation easement has specific
provisions detailing what the landowner or occupier can and cannot do
to and on the land. A conservation easement also gives the holder of the
easement the affirmative right to inspect the land to determine
compliance with the restrictions. 2 5 Conservation easements are
22 Chase, supra note 13.
23 French, supra note 9.
24 John Pendergrass, Use of Institutional Controls as Part of a Superfiind Remedy:
Lessons from Other Programs, 26 Envtl. L Rep. 10109-23 (1996).
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available to a governmental body whose purpose includes protecting
natural resources or maintaining or enhancing air or water quality.
Furthermore, they are required to run with the land and are binding on
subsequent owners of the servient estate.2 6
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA) was approved in
1981National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Such proposals must be adopted by legislatures to become effective,
but, by the mid 1990s, it had been adopted in fourteen states and the
District of Columbia.2 7 The UCEA specifies that a conservation
easement is valid even though it is not appurtenant, is assignable, is not
traditionally recognized at common law, imposes a negative burden,
does not touch or concern real property, and is without privity of estate
or contract.2
8
Conservation easements are not an ideal institutional control for
contaminated sites. Their most fundamental drawback has to do with
their purpose. They can be used only for certain goals and those often
do not fit the goals of an institutional control at a contaminated site.29
In addition, violations of conservation easements cannot always be
redressed. In the case of a violation, the easement holder only has a
limited amount of time (defined by the statute) in which to bring suit
to restrain or reverse the owner's action. In addition, if the easement
holder fails to act, no third party may bring suit against the owner. 3 0
Moreover, as with use restrictions based on common law, there is a lack
of uniformity among the states with respect to conservation
easements. 3 1 Furthermore, some state statutes enabling conservation
easements do not authorize the federal government to hold these
easements. 3 2 Finally, some state statutes limit the duration of
25 Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in
the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 433-95
(1984).
26 Ayers, supra note 17.
27 Pendergrass, supra note 24.
28 Karen A. Jordan, Perpetual Conservation: Accomplishing the Goal Through
Preemptive Federal Easement Program, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 401-89 (1993).
29 George Wyeth, Personal Communication (1997).
30 See Pendergrass, supra note 24.
31 See Ayers, supra 17.
32 See Jordan, supra note 28.
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conservation easements rather than allowing them to exist in
perpetuity. 33
Statutory provisions for contaminated property
A few states have adopted statutes designed specifically to restrict
use of contaminated property through easements and other deed
restrictions. For example, Minnesota has a voluntary cleanup program
in which remediators are released from future cleanup liability if
property owners agree to use restrictions that bind their successors.
Michigan sets cleanup standards based upon use categories and with use
restrictions recorded in restrictive covenants that by statute run with the
land. Statutory provisions of Ohio's Voluntary Cleanup Program of
1994, and California's Expedited Remedial Action Reform Act of
1994 provide for use restrictions that run with the land. Also,
Connecticut, in a program to encourage brownfields reuse, allows
cleanup to less-than-residential standards, provided that the owner
agrees to an "environmental use restriction" to run with the land.
3 4
Connecticut also provides that if a court finds that an environmental
use restriction is unenforceable, the property owner must abate the
pollution to levels acceptable for residential or recreational uses. 3 5 In
addition, Massachusetts has adopted a statute creating a class of
statutory easements exempt from historic doctrines that limit their
effectiveness. 3 6
Statutes such as these can overcome many of the limitations
associated with common law servitudes, and, unlike state statutes
providing for conservation easements, they are tailored to contaminated
sites. But problems remain, both for sites in states that do not yet have
such statutes and for sites where statutory uniformity is desirable, such
as NPL sites. Lack of uniformity in statutory authority can complicate
(and thus escalate the cost) deed restrictions included as a part of a
remedial approach. A federal statute providing for use restrictions at
contaminated sites, especially NPL sites, is needed. While such federal
legislation has been considered, none has yet been enacted.
33 Id.
34 See Borinsky, supra note 11.
35 Id.
36 See George Wyeth, Land Use and Cleanups: Beyond the Rhetoric, 26 Envtl. L.
Rep. 10358-66 (1996).
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Local Land Use Controls
The apparatus of local land use regulation (eg. comprehensive plans,
zoning, subdivision controls, building codes, and construction permits)
can be used to restrict the use of contaminated sites. While not
originally intended to prevent exposure to contaminants, these
mechanisms have become part of the armory of institutional controls.
However, it is questionable whether they should be exclusively relied
upon for the reasons given below.
First, it is not clear whether local governments can effectively enact
the zoning amendments that typically might be used with a
contaminated site. While special permits (also called conditional use
permits or special exceptions) are a well-accepted tool to add flexibility
to land use controls, it remains to be seen how courts will react to
challenged local zoning changes that are products of a remediation
approach for a contaminated site. Although local zoning ordinances are
enacted within the framework of state enabling legislation, courts have
overruled such ordinances if they violate the purpose of the ordinance
(for example, if they promote narrow interests rather than the public
health, safety, and welfare) or if they are deemed to be
unconstitutional, particularly under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment or the "takings"
clause of the Fifth Amendment. Institutional controls based on zoning
are vulnerable to changing legal interpretations of what is a
constitutional land use regulation.
Second, local governments can repeal or modify any ordinances
that they create. In no other area of American law are there such
frequent requests for amendments to the law as with land use, and
decisions about land use have been among the most controversial and
contested issues in many communities. 3 7 Thus, zoning may be the
most unreliable of all governmental institutional controls. 38
Zoning statutes, in some states, stipulate that decisions concerning
local zoning ordinances must be made within the context of a
comprehensive plan. However, the constraints on a local government's
ability to rezone property are, in practice, often largely procedural: A
37 See Hersh, supra note 21.
38 See David F. Coursen, Institutional Controls at Superfind Sites, 23 Envdl. L.
Rep. 10279-83 (1993).
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notice must be issued, the application to change the ordinance must be
reviewed by the planning commission, and a public hearing must be
held. To the extent that local governments lack specific standards that
must be applied to rezoning requests, they have considerable discretion
to amend and reamend zoning ordinances. In essence, decisions about
the zoning ordinance ultimately are made in the political rather than
the administrative arena. Especially when decisions are made in such an
arena, they tend to favor the more powerful local interests.3 9 Rezoning
is often sought to enable a more intensive, profitable use, which may be
supported by local officials as beneficial for the local tax base. 40
Third, a zoning ordinance that restricts uses of a contaminated site
may be modified at some future date by a zoning variance or
exception. Variances, traditionally intended only for conditions of
undue hardship, are becoming increasingly common. Studies have
shown 63% to 85% approval rates for use variances by boards of appeal.
There is no reason to assume that these rates will be different in the
future. 4 1 Variances and exceptions are decided by boards of appeal
and planning commissions whose members often come from the
business interests that drive local development: developers, building
contractors, real estate agents, etc. Such variances and exceptions could
jeopardize institutional controls that have been implemented through
zoning, especially if the underlying reason for the use restrictions is
forgotten over time.42
Fourth, apart from whether zoning ordinances are susceptible to
amendments, variances, or exceptions, there remains the question: Can
local governments effectively enforce institutional controls that rely on
zoning, especially over the long term? Zoning is enforced through local
agency staff review of site plans in advance of construction and
inspection after construction to determine whether it was built
according to plan. In theory, building inspectors regularly visit all
buildings in a locality to ensure that they remain in compliance with the
building codes. When violations are discovered, localities can revoke
39 See Timothy Beatley, Ethical Land Use: Principles of Policy and Planning
(1994).
40 See Hearsh, supra note 21.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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building permits or issue a "stop work" order for a building under
construction, and they can bring an enforcement action, and levy civil
penalties against persons in violation and threaten criminal proceedings
for already completed buildings or similar actions.4 3
Nevertheless, conventional local land use controls are apt to
encounter problems with some complex issues that may arise with
residual contamination. For example, the traditional "front line" of
land use controls - the granting and denial of building permits -
may be inadequate to deal with situations such as monitoring the
conditions of a paved parking lot used to cap contaminated soils,
assessing how well landscape buffers keep people from contaminants at
sites that have become recreational, and noticing a change to a non-
conforming use at a site where no construction has taken place. 4 4
Further, planning commissions do not routinely examine deed
restrictions when doing comprehensive planning, which could lead to
recommending inappropriate zoning changes. Similarly, local building
officials ordinarily do not consult property transfer instruments when
issuing construction permits and could inadvertently issue permits that
would allow for the disturbance of contaminated soil.45
To implement effective institutional controls at contaminated sites,
local governments will have to go beyond the traditional mechanisms of
zoning and building code enforcement. These added responsibilities
will require a broader and more coordinated system of implementation
and enforcement that could prove difficult for local governments to
carry out.4 6 Local governments will incur extra costs with these extra
duties. Without supplementary funds, local governments are especially
unlikely to be enthusiastic about attempting to introduce more effective
systems for monitoring and enforcing institutional controls.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See Borinsky, supra note 11.
46 See Hearsh, supra note 21.
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Other Types of Institutional Controls
In addition to restrictions imposed through statutory or common
law instruments, various other actions should be thought of as
institutional controls, because they reduce the likelihood of exposure to
residual contaminants through continued human vigilance rather than
cleanup.
Fences and Signs
Physical access to a contaminated site can be prevented with fences
and warning signs. These are often temporary measures to bar access
before and during cleanup, but they also can be used as a long-term
institutional control. To be effective, however, they must be durable
and effective. The fence must keep out people, pets, livestock, and
possibly wildlife. All signs must be easily understood by all, including
children and foreignors.
Notification
When contamination remains on-site or in groundwater,
notification to various people may be needed. A deed notice is one
common mechanism. A deed notice alerts prospective site purchasers to
residual contamination and the responsibilities they would assume.
Other people may also need notification, however: the site's tenants,
neighboring property owners and their tenants, community
organizations, local real estate agents, municipal building inspectors and
engineering departments, and other regulatory and planning agencies.
Local or state governments may be called upon to implement these
wider notification systems. For example, most states have groundwater
classification systems that help people determine the water quality of
the area in which they live. Nonetheless, when groundwater migrates
from a contaminated site, the local health department may need to
notify nearby property owners who use private wells so that their water
can be tested for contamination.
Monitoring
When a site cleanup has been completed but some contaminants
remain, on-site or off-site monitoring may be needed to determine
whether contaminants have migrated through groundwater, surface
water runoff, soil erosion, or airborne particles. Monitoring may be
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conducted either for a specified time period or until a specified
reduction in contamination is attained. Issues to be resolved include the
sampling collection and analysis methods, the number of spots to be
sampled, and the sampling frequency. The resolution of these issues
depends on site-specific circumstances, including a schedule for
monitoring and clear allocation of monitoring responsibilities. 47
Groundwater can be especially troublesome. Groundwater
contamination plumes can move from long to short distances per day
depending on the hydrogeological conditions. The rate and direction
of movement can be difficult and expensive to predict with any degree
of certainty, partly because the flow of groundwater is subject to
changing consumption patterns (e.g., from drinking water, irrigation,
livestock watering, and industrial use), and these patterns cannot always
be anticipated.4 8
If monitoring shows that contaminated groundwater has begun to
migrate off-site, potential users should be alerted and alternate water
supplies may be needed. For example, if private wells are contaminated
or at risk, residents may be provided with bottled water until their well
water is determined to be unpolluted or until they have been hooked up
to the public water supply. Nevertheless, while restrictions can be placed
on the drilling of new wells on private property, no state has the
authority to restrict the use of existing private wells. Furthermore,
private well owners are not required to have their wells tested.4 9 In
addition, states that provide free testing primarily check for nitrate
contamination, which entails a relatively inexpensive test, but testing for
numerous chemical contaminants can be expensive and technically
difficult. 5°
47 Memorandum from Dominic H. Frinzi, Jr. on Institutional Controls (Mar. 19,
1996) (on file with author).
48 Superfund Reauthorization Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce (May 23,
1995) (statement of Velma M. Smith, Friends of the Earth).
49 See Pendergrass, supra note 24.
50 [d.
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Conclusion
The institutional controls described above are becoming
increasingly routine in site remedies, and concern about their ability to
prevent exposure to residual contaminants is growing. Clearly, creative
options for improving institutional controls are needed. In crafting
these options, a few key messages are clear:
* Deed restrictions should, if possible, be grounded in statutory
rather than common law. If common law instruments must be used,
easements are generally preferable to restrictive covenants or equitable
servitudes.
* Deed restrictions should be clearly written, with explicit statements
of intent, notice, and assignability.
* Local land use controls such as zoning should supplement other
institutional controls; they should not be the primary means by which
use restrictions are imposed.
* With institutional controls, including, but not limited to, deed
restrictions and local land use controls, periodic checks should be
required to ensure that conditions are being met and to allow timely
enforcement if they are not. Similarly, monitoring, such as monitoring
groundwater contamination, should be done according to a pre-
determined schedule.
* Responsibility for monitoring and other follow-up checks should be
allocated to an entity that can be expected to remain in existence, with
assignability of duties if it does not. Special funding arrangements may
be needed to ensure that these responsibilities can be carried out.
While not startling, these messages are difficult to effectuate.
Moreover, as yet they are not sufficiently understood by the various
federal, state, and local officials who may be called upon to implement
institutional controls (whether or not those officials were involved in
decisions that led to the controls). A much keener and more
widespread understanding is needed, by both officials and lay citizens,
of the promises and perils of institutional controls and what can be
done to improve them.
Despite the best of intentions, remediation plans and institutional
controls, residual contaminants at some sites will continue to pose high
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risks. In such cases, the site (or the severely contaminated portions of
the site) should not be released for private use. The ultimate form of
institutional control is ownership by an organization that is likely to stay
intact, with good records and orderly arrangements for transfer of
responsibilities, if necessary. While government agencies are by no
means ideal, they may come closest to meeting these requisites. Thus,
government ownership should be considered for sites (or portions of
sites) with especially serious residual contamination. While this policy
has been followed for some sites, especially those within the U.S.
weapons complex that became contaminated as a result of government
activity, it is by no means assured in the current era of privatization. A
key question - and one that cannot be tackled here - is what risk
level merits full government ownership and control?
Government ownership of highly contaminated sites does not
eliminate the need to consider some of the institutional controls
discussed above, such as monitoring and physical access restrictions, but
it simplifies questions concerning who legally controls use of the
property. Furthermore, severely contaminated sites whose initial
remediation plans have relied on institutional controls for lack of an
appropriate technology should be periodically revisited (as is called for
under the National Contingency Plan), to determine whether cost-
effective cleanup technologies have since been developed.
Despite improvements in cleanup technologies, the need for
institutional controls is not likely to go away. For better or for worse,
they are an essential part of many remediation plans. It thus becomes all
the more important to ensure that they meet the criteria identified
above: that they are effective and appropriate; that they can be verified
and enforced; and that they remain durable for as long as significant
risks from exposure to residual contaminants remain. If institutional
controls can be crafted to meet these criteria, they will be a significant
help to risk-based approaches to contaminated sites. If they cannot,
contaminated sites will be an unseen potentially significant hazard.
